In situations of violent group conflict, group members often argue about how to deal with the outgroup. While some argue for aggression, force and separation, others argue for negotiation and cooperation. Each side attempts to persuade the group that their own position is normative and is most in line with the interests and essence of the group. These arguments often involve denunciations of opponents as disloyal or This entails a claim that they are the most authentic representatives of the group, and their opponents have no claim to speak as a group member. This paper examines how a UK-based Al-Qaeda-supporting organisation characterizes political contact and cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims in the UK as counter-normative, and those Muslims who do advocate cooperation as deviant. It illustrates how a group arguing for separation and hostility comments on, denigrates, and discourages other Muslims from allying with non-Muslims. Examining how one set of group members are denounced and discounted by another set of group members illustrates how dangerous it is for social psychologists to treat group norms or prototypicality as consensual.
In situations of violent group conflict, group members often argue over issues such as the definition of group identities, norms, loyalty and deviance. Those arguing for separation or violence ('hawks') might construct cooperation with the outgroup as disloyal and counter-normative. In contrast, those rejecting violence and advocating positive contact ('doves') might construct violence and disengagement as counternormative and deviant. Each side attempts to persuade the group that their own position is normative and is most in line with the interests and essence of the group.
This entails a claim that they are the most authentic representatives of the group, and their opponents have no claim to speak as a group member. This paper examines how a UK-based Al-Qaeda-supporting organisation characterizes political contact and cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims in the UK as counter-normative, and those Muslims who do advocate cooperation as deviant. It illustrates how a group arguing for separation and hostility comments on, denigrates, and discourages other Muslims from allying with non-Muslims. Examining how one set of group members are denounced and discounted by another set of group members illustrates how dangerous it is for social psychologists to treat group norms or prototypicality as consensual.
This paper starts with the assumption that people define groups and identities in ways that legitimate their political projects (Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001 ). As Reicher, Haslam and Hopkins (2005, p563 ) point out in their discussion of leaders as 'entrepreneurs of identity': "..leaders are not passive onlookers when it comes to identity processes. They actively intervene in creating and redefining identities and thereby in creating and transforming their followers." These constructions of identities function to explain situations, organize actions, negotiate intergroup relations, and counter alternative definitions (Hopkins, Kahani-Hopkins & Reicher, 2006; Hopkins, Reicher & Kahani-Hopkins, 2003) . Such issues are often matters of dispute between those who are nominally part of the same social group but who have different political agendas: members with differing definitions of the content of group identity, its values, and the actions it should take to secure the future (for an example from Israel see Zemlinskaya, 2008) . Studies have shown how, for example, politicians and others construct versions of themselves and their views as part of the majority or as representing the true values of the group, at the same time as positioning their opponents as unrepresentative (e.g. Finlay, 2005; Leudar, Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2011; Wood & Finlay, 2007; Yildiz & Verkutyen, 2012) .
For example, Burns and Stevenson (2011) have shown how Irish politicians strategically construct and deconstruct the nation in order to explain their own electoral success and failure. These politicians accounted for winning a referendum on Europe by constructing versions of the nation as having a 'settled will' in line with their own political position. When the same politicians accounted for losing a similar referendum the electorate was characterized as divided or as driven by fear, nervousness or malign external influence. In this way the opposition's claims to represent the true voice of the nation on the basis of winning the vote were refuted.
Research on group schisms has similarly shown how members of each sub-group define their own faction as representing the true essence of the group (Sani & Reicher, 1998; 2000) . If we accept that groups can be realms of argument and debate, and that they contain struggles for dominance, then this should affect how we conceive of basic concepts such as social identity, stereotypes, context, norms and prototypes (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001 ).
When we examine real situations of group conflict, we find that one way in which people argue that their version of the group and its context is correct is through denunciations of those with whom they disagree. Although the practice of denunciation has been discussed by sociologists (e.g. Garfinkel, 1956; Brinkerhoff & Burke, 1980) and historians (for a review see Fiztzpatrick & Gellately, 1996) , denunciations have received only limited attention in social psychology (although see Finlay 2005; ; see also Bar Tal, 1997 on the 'monopolization of patriotism'). To denounce is either to 'accuse publicly ', to 'condemn' or to 'inform against' (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1990) . In practice, to denounce is to claim there is something about the other's identity or behaviour which is offensive or dangerous to the integrity of the group. It may involve questioning the other's loyalty to the state, the community or to the ideological programme. In religious sects, for example, denunciation may involve highlighting one behaviour or act of 'questioning' and then generalizing this to other aspects of the accusee's identity and commitment (Brinkerhoff & Burke, 1980) . According to Fitzpatrick and Gellately (1996) , "the practice of denunciation exists to some degree in all organized societies" (p759; see also Garfinkel, 1956 ).
Institutionalized forms of denunciation are part of law enforcement and other forms of social regulation in established democracies, while "police, revolutionary, and theocratic states and communities -as well as twentieth-century totalitarian stateshave been particularly likely to encourage their citizens or members to write denunciations against each other for purposes of maintaining social control, ideological purity, virtue, and so on" (Fitzpatrick & Gellately, 1996, p 761) . Although the phenomenon of individual denunciations made by citizens to the authorities and the press has been the subject of historical research (e.g. Bytwerk, 1983; Gellately, 1990) , denunciation can take many forms and can serve many functions . In situations of group conflict and in authoritarian regimes it is used to suppress criticism and dissent, acting both as a form of social sanction and a warning to others (e.g. Dittmer, 1977 ; see also Levine & Moreland, 2002 , for a discussion of reactions to disloyalty). When political groups or religious sects have internal arguments over important political issues, it is used to suggest opponents have strayed from the correct path, casting their arguments as unreliable and unrepresentative of the group's values. Denunciation can therefore function as: a public display of norms; a sanction to ensure conformity; a display of commitment to the group by the accuser; a method of revealing hidden 'enemies'; and a way of silencing opponents or damaging their reputation. Typically it involves explanatory accounts of ignorance, selfishness, pathology or malign influence. Just as individuals can be denounced, so can sub-groups and unnamed, generalized others.
Denunciation involves the condemnation of those accused of infringing the basic values of the group, and is therefore relevant to understanding social psychological issues such as the construction of deviance, prototypicality and group norms. When it occurs in situations of group conflict, we also see how hostile and violent relations between groups can be sustained through intra-group social practices. This paper takes the position that to understand social life it is important to examine the social practices of which it is made up. In this respect it shares the concerns of discourse analysts, conversation analysts, and other social psychologists who draw on social/political sciences and historical research. This is not to claim that the study of beliefs, attitudes and emotions is unimportant, just that we need to do both. The study of real-life situations is a crucial counter to research which breaks variables into separate units and studies them in controlled contexts, because it allows us to see how intertwined such variables and processes can be outside the laboratory.
Since denunciation involves an accusation that another person or group has committed an offence, it involves the specification of a prescriptive norm which has been violated, as well as the construction of a 'good' versus a 'bad' member of the group. This is relevant to understandings of the 'black sheep effect' (Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988; and disloyalty/defection in groups (Levine & Moreland, 2002; Mannetti et al, 2010) . Studies of the 'black sheep effect' suggest that, in particular circumstances, an 'unlikeable', 'unfavourable', 'deviant' or 'nonprototypical' ingroup member is judged less favourably than a comparable outgroup member. These experimental studies create a pre-determined non-prototypical (or counter-normative) target in a range of ways: by describing poor performance (e.g. Lewis & Sherman, 2010; ; unfavourable character descriptions (e.g. Marques, Robalo & Rocha, 1992; ; disloyalty (Branscombe, Wann, Noel & Coleman, 1993) ; lack of stereotypical traits (e.g. Abrams, Marques, Bown & Henson, 2000; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001 ); nonmodal behaviours (Marques, Abrams, Paez & Martinez-Taboada, 1998) ; or beliefs (e.g. Abrams et al, 2000; Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Pinto, Marques, Levine & Abrams, 2010; Scheepers, Branscombe, Spears & Doosje, 2002) . Such studies are useful, but understanding norms and deviance in real-life situations of political turmoil requires us to take a step further and accept that what counts as a normative behaviour or belief can be a political judgement rather than a fact. In political disputes, norms are constructed by group members to argue that their agenda is correct (and vice-versa) , and their in-group opponents are wrong. If norms are disputed, then what counts as 'disloyalty' and 'defection' can also be a contested issue.
In intergroup situations involving conflict, one important set of prescriptive norms concern group contact and attitudes towards the outgroup. In situations of sectarian conflict, racial segregation or inequality, we might find norms and sanctions which discourage contact with other groups (Allport, 1954/8; Pettigrew, 1998 ; for examples see Connolly, 2000; Dixon & Durrheim, 2003; Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006 ) and accusations of disloyalty directed at those who engage in such contact (Finlay, 2005 (Finlay, , 2007 . We also find members of groups argue over these norms.
Examples of such arguments include those between 'hawks' and 'doves' during war, between opponents and proponents of racial and caste segregation, and between those for and against inter-ethnic marriage in multicultural societies.
Arguments over contact norms are found among Muslims with different political, theological and cultural backgrounds and projects (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006) . Muslims are a heterogeneous social group. According to Jackson (2007) the category includes 'over a billion people from more than 50 countries, languages and cultures, five major doctrinal groupings and hundreds of smaller sects, theological traditions and cultural-religious variants' (p413; see also Esposito, 1991) .
The variation provides for a range of differing practices, rules for living as well as widespread debate over the meaning or application of Quranic verses (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009; Malik, 2006; Peters, 1996) . For example, Roy (2005) describes the differing interpretations of Islam from fundamentalist as opposed to The data I present here consist of emails sent out by a UK Al-Qaeda-supporting group (for discussion of the difficulties of terms such as 'extremist', 'jihadist', 'islamist' see Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009; Jenkins, 2007) . The communications use the category 'moderate' in a pejorative sense and question the use of the term 'extremist' and 'fundamentalist', declaring that this term is used to silence Muslims with a political orientation or who speak with a 'true' understanding of Islam (see Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009 for debates on this issue). The analysis will first examine the construction of prescriptive norms against political contact and cooperation with non-Muslims. It will then illustrate how denunciations and particular explanatory accounts are used to present fellow Muslims who engage in such contact as deviant and disloyal.
Method The Organisation
The data set consists of a collection of e-mails from an organisation called the Party for Islamic Renewal (PIR), which is linked to the Tajdeed.net web-site. Tajdeed is Arabic for Renewal. The PIR was formerly known as the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR). The PIR and Tajdeed web-site were run by the Saudi dissident Mohammed al-Masari (also spelt al-Massari). The Tajdeed web-site, often described in the press as a 'jihadi' site, was reported as posting video messages from 
Analytic Approach
Although the analysis shares the view of critical discursive approaches that writers and speakers 'draw on cultural resources that have a history, and the repetition of these resources has important social consequences that we need to study' (Wetherell, 2003, p26) , this paper uses thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) . This approach was chosen because the goal of the paper is to provide a broad overview of 1) the construction of prescriptive social norms (in particular norms against political cooperation and contact) and 2) the denunciation of 'moderates' who break these norms. The aim was to identify broad themes used to construct the commentators' political positions as correct and those of other Muslims as incorrect, and to examine how social identities and psychological explanations feature in these constructions.
Although much could be gained from a discursive analysis, the level of detail required would only have permitted a small number of quotes to be analysed, and would therefore not have allowed such a broad sweep. Although attention is paid to the cultural resources drawn on in these constructions (for example the notion of 'kufr'), less attention is therefore given to a detailed consideration of more local aspects of context.
All emails that mentioned the issue of political contact with, or influence by, non-Muslims, or participation in secular political processes, were identified and the specific context of this contact was noted. Thematic analysis focused on 1) reasons offered for why such contact was to be avoided (i.e. arguments supporting norms of political separation and non-contact), and 2) the ways in which Muslims engaging in such contact were denounced and constructed as deviant through the use of labels, slurs and explanatory accounts. The former are presented in the first half of the Analysis section. The latter are described in the second half of the Analysis section.
Analysis
The analysis focuses on mailings which refer to situations of political contact, stronger ties with their 'own community' in order to achieve political change. In no case in the data-set were arguments made in favour of political or personal contact between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Preliminary Note on the Concept of 'Kufr'
Before examining the extracts, the concepts of 'kufr' and 'shirk' need to be described.
The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam defines al-Kufr as 'Unbelief in God, the state of being an infidel, blasphemy' (Glassé, 1989, p241) . Watt (1964) describes the concept as 'that which characterizes non-Muslims or rather opponents of the Islamic community, and also that which changes a Muslim into an opponent of the community. Any article of belief or any activity which was felt to indicate that a man had broken away from the Islamic community would be an instance of kufr' (p11).
Watt goes on to write that a 'man ceases to be a member if he does something which the general body of Muslims feel to be incompatible with membership. Usually this will be something which aligns him with a rival community" (p12). The concept of 'kufr', then, is ideal in arguments about identity and who should represent the groupto accuse another party of kufr is a discursive move to declare them no longer a group member and therefore to deny their right to speak from the same identity position. The same root is found in the word 'kuffar' ('kafir'), which describes a group of people. A kafir is 'one who refuses to see the truth, an infidel' (Glassé, 1989, p216) .
The act of declaring a Muslim to be a kuffar is 'takfir/takfeer', while the behaviour which causes a person to be declared kuffar is called the 'mukaffir'. The concept of shirk is used in a similar way. 'Shirk' is the sin of associating something with God (idolatory). Like the concept of 'kufr', the root of 'shirk' also describes an outgroup: "The sin of shirk ("association") is a name for paganism: pagans are called 'the associators' (mushrikun)" (Glassé, 1989, p370) . When these terms can legitimately be used is a controversial matter, and is the subject of debate among Muslim scholars and commentators.
The notion of 'kufr' is used extensively in the emails to describe the UK political system and Western society. It is an essentialist and homogenising label used to group non-Muslims into the same moral, political and cultural system, defined by its essential 'kufr' nature. Kufr is everything which is not Islam, and kuffar are everyone who are not Muslims -it is a powerful and concise way of saying 'not us'.
It is also of central importance to the distinction between 'dar al-Islam' (the land of Islam) and 'dar al-kufr/harb' (the land of non-believers/war) which is part of the debates over 'da'wah' between UK Muslims described by Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins (2002) . Da'wah is the 'call' to Islam, and is interpreted in a variety of ways by different movements and traditions (Esposito, 2003) . Some see da'wah as calling The split is made here for the purposes of clarity, however the construction of deviance is part of the construction of norms and they often occur within the same account. Because the main focus is the practice of denunciation, more detailed analysis will be presented in the second section. What we believe and take as a religion is that participating in the legislative assemblies is Kufr, and Shirk in Allah (..) this is because these assemblies give the right of legislating unlimitedly to humans, and not their Lord, and the evidences that such an action is from the clear Mukaffirat (actions causing disbelief) and nullifiers of Islam, are many (..) there are several inescapable causes of Takfir (..) the most dangerous of these is accepting the right that the constitution bestows upon the member, to legislate limitlessly, and to abide by that, and this is clear-cut Kufr. 
2) Western opposition to core Islamic values. Here it is argued that Muslims should not cooperate because the 'kuffar' oppose Islamic values (and therefore Islam).
Evidence is provided by politicians' opposition to certain positions which the commentators claim represent the true spirit of Islam. These include support for Shariah, the Muslim Brotherhood, the mujahideen, Sayid Qutb and Al Qaeda, and rejection of secular nationalism. For example, commentator B (11/4) argues that Muslims should not be loyal to 'Kafir' political parties because: 'All the Kafir political parties are peddling the same kuffar excrement because they oppose the Shariah of Allah.' Not only does this essentialise the political parties (as essentially 'kafir') but it also presents a strong extreme case that they are 'all' the same. This flexibility of the 'kufr' root means that it can be applied to a group, a system, or any other thing seen to be un-Islamic. The use of the term 'kuffar excrement' implies the ideology to be disgusting, a theme linked to notions of contagion that we will see later.
In attacks on George Galloway, his support for 'apostate Arab rulers like Nasser A related argument that runs through many emails is that the UK is racist and Islamaphobic: Muslims are structurally disadvantaged in society and victimised by the security services. For example, B (2/9) argues 'British Muslims are disadvantaged and discriminated against. They are the last to get hired and the first to get fired.'
In an echo of an argument in an Al Qaeda treatise on Loyalty and Enmity (Al Zawahiri, 2002) , it is also argued that non-Muslims want Muslims to turn away from Islam (see also Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004a) . The following quote begins with an injunction from the Quran, then follows with a warning that George Galloway wants Muslims to reject Allah. The category 'kuffar' is again used to suggest that all political parties, and the United Nations, have the same basic orientation and aim. The notion of contagion is also linked to cultural tropes implying subservience (described below). In the following quote, the MCB, by cooperating with the taskforce on extremism, endanger other Muslims:
Obviously other Muslims are not safe from the tongues of the MCB, and I don't mean because they are infected with Blair's backside bacteria, but because the MCB also use their tongues to make Muslims unsafe from the attention of Blair the war criminal Kuffar. Which means the MCB is a Kaafir organisation. (Extract 9: B 4/8)
To summarize, the emails construct a prescriptive group norm whereby avoidance of political contact and cooperation with non-Muslims is consonant with authentic Muslim values and interests. This then allows those Muslims who break this norm by engaging with Western politics and secular institutions to be discounted as deviant and disloyal. The next section illustrates how these 'moderate' Muslims are denounced in ways that both explain their behaviour in derogatory terms, and categorize them in such a way as to deny their claim to represent Muslims.
Denunciation and Derogation: The Construction of Deviants
A great variety of derogatory names and concepts are used to denounce Muslims in the UK who are seen as being too close to non-Muslims. These are divided into themes of apostasy/losing one's Muslim identity, subservience, and self-interest and ignorance. These accounts and descriptions explain the behaviour of targets as based on weakness, ignorance, character flaws or religious deviation rather than due to considered political beliefs or alternative theological interpretation. As we will see below, historical precedent is regularly drawn on in these denunciations. For example, references are frequently made to crusades and crusaders, a common feature of Al Qaeda discourse (see Ibrahim, 2007) . Commentator E (28/6) discusses Iqbal Sacranie's (leader of the MCB) acceptance of a knighthood, which is described as 'an award which was to honour crusaders … you know the knights of Britain who wreaked havoc in the Holy Lands causing rivers of the blood of innocent Muslims to flow knee-deep through Jerusalem?' Here, the acceptance of the award means Sacranie has joined the aggressors against Muslims: 'a man who claims to represent the face of ordinary British Muslims is to become a Crusader.'
The charge of apostasy and/or joining the 'kuffar' is a categorical judgement in these extracts rather than an explanatory account: it is an assertion that the target is no longer a category member, and thus has no speaking position as a Muslim. The notion of an inferiority complex is used to denounce moderates. In a similar way to ideas of Jewish self-hatred (Lewin, 1941; Finlay, 2005) it is suggested that domination by the British (historically and through being in a minority in Britain) has led to a pathology of identity -the targets are 'mentally colonised' or suffer from an 'inferiority complex', causing them to revere and bow before non-Muslims, and ultimately betray their roots: He's figured that the British Muslims are so mentally colonised from the days of the old British Empire that if they see a white man showing sympathy for them then they'll be flocking to him. (Extract 14: B 24/4) In this extract we see history again used as a resource for derogation. History (and 'serial connectedness ' -Condor, 1996) is an important feature in debates about identity and political action (Condor, 2006; Lyons, 1996 ; for examples in Muslim politics see Hopkins et al, 2003; McKinlay, McVittie & Sambaraju, 2011) . In the PIR mailings the history of colonial rule in India, the Crusades, and the Inquisition were frequently used to denounce opponents. Thus B discusses Islamophobia in the UK, and links this to colonial rule in India:
The wholesale betrayal of the UK Muslim population by the Establishment should have been enough to get Muslims on the warpath; never mind the Crusade against Iraq and Afghanistan. This lack of backbone is consistent with the attitude from back in the days British colonial rule in India. As with Garfinkel's (1956) description of 'status degradation ceremonies', accounts of the reasons or motives for the other's behaviour are a crucial feature of the denunciations seen here. By using explanations based on character failings, there is no need to examine the possible logical, theological or political analyses behind an opponent's position, and the reaction is one of moral indignation or disgust rather than debate. Orcutt (1973) suggests that when deviance is attributed to character failings (rather than situational pressures), the reaction of other group members is more likely to be exclusionary -isolating and excluding the individual from the group (see also Levine & Kerr, 2007; Levine & Moreland, 2002) .
Although each situation of violent conflict has its own particular cultural and historical context, militants face a common problem in dealing with fellow groupmembers who disagree. A response found in a number of situations is to delegitimize this section of the community using a variety of denunciations and derogations (Finlay, 2005; . These social practices are part of explicit attempts at social influence and the regulation of the group. Public demonization is a warning to others as to how they might be branded should they adopt a similar position, and it is relevant that some of the slurs in the data presented in the second section seem directed particularly at the sensitivities of young men, in particular at their bravery (e.g. 'lack of backbone'), integrity (e.g. 'bootlickers'), loyalty (e.g. 'they have .. foulmouthed their ancestry') and masculinity (e.g. 'compliant eunochs'). For those members who are undecided about their position, it gives emotive reasons not to be a moderate -they would become 'brown tongues', their masculinity would be questioned, they would be labelled mentally and morally weak, they would become apostates. This is also reflected in research into Al Qaeda communications, which separate, for example, pious youth from those susceptible to western influence, and 'islam' from 'kufr' (Cheong & Halverson, 2010) . In a recent report, Musawi (2010) discusses how 'Salafist-Jihadist' web-sites devote a good deal of space to attacking those they perceive to be 'internal enemies'. The issue of moderate Muslims has also been a subject discussed by Al Qaeda leaders. For example, Al Qaeda issued an essay entitled "Moderate Islam is a prostration to the West" which appeared on many websites (translated in Ibrahim, 2007) , and Ayman Al-Zawahiri (2002) wrote a whole treatise on the subject of 'Wala/Bara' (Loyalty and Enmity).
There are similarities between the arguments used here to discount internal opponents and those described in other studies of political rhetoric. Politicians often claim that they represent the majority while their opponents are disconnected from the people or represent a minority or politically elite grouping (e.g. Rapley, 1998; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2011; Stevenson et al, 2007) . The notion of mental colonisation (or internalized oppression) seen in the section on subservience is used in hawkish Zionist discourse to discount the peace movement in Israel as 'self-hating' (Finlay, 2005) , the notion of weakness or cowardice is used by far-right politicians to discount mainstream politicians (Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2011; Wood & Finlay, 2008) , and notions of bribery, personal reward and ignorance (seen in the section on self-interest) are found in fascist rhetoric to delegitimize members of the ingroup who oppose racism and anti-semitism (Finlay, 2007; Wood & Finlay, 2008) . These types of accounts fall into the category of the 'psychologization' of opponents (Papastamou, 1986) . Historical studies show similar strategies, where American and French revolutionaries tended to understand opposition in terms of greed, selfishness and corruption (e.g. Ducharme & Fine, 1995; .
In the communications analysed above, historical comparisons relating to the history of Muslims and colonialism are drawn on in both the construction of norms and deviance. This temporal aspect is important to acknowledge (see Condor, 1996 Condor, , 2006 , for discussions of this issue) since the emails construct a version of the world where the West is historically attacking Muslims, and where current Muslims engaging in political contact are just the most recent examples of an historicallyenduring category of apostates or subservient Muslims. Similar discursive themes can be seen in other historical contexts and other Islamic political movements, from the ideology of the Kharijites of the seventh century, through to the anti-colonial revivalist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Esposito, 1991) . These movements also argued for an Islamic system devoid of western influence and rallied against the leaders of many Muslim countries seen as too westernized.
To conclude, in conflict situations members who engage positively with outgroups pose a threat to other group members who argue for separation and/or hostility. In such cases, norms of intergroup contact are disputed within the group. If norms are disputed, so are constructions of prototypicality and deviance, and it is the job of those who wish to lead the group to try and get their versions accepted. In this paper we have seen in some detail how a group advocating militancy use the practice of denunciation to present disengagement as normative, and those engaging in cooperative contact as deviant. This illustrates one way in which intra-group practices of social influence are an important aspect of intergroup conflict. Finally, our understanding of norms and deviance need to recognize that these constructs might not be consensual, but are often constructed in political arguments to align with ideological positions.
